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Complex systems consisting of interdependent subsystems may be represented by multi-layer
networks, with interdependency links between layers. The giant mutually connected component
(GMCC) of such an interdependent (or multiplex) network collapses with a discontinuous hybrid
transition under random damage to the network. If the nodes to be damaged are selected in a
targeted way, the collapse of the GMCC may occur significantly sooner. Understanding the limits
of the resilience of such systems to targeted attacks is therefore an essential problem. Finding the
minimal damage set which destroys the largest mutually connected component of a given interde-
pendent network is a computationally prohibitive simultaneous optimization problem. We introduce
a simple heuristic strategy—Effective Multiplex Degree—for targeted attack on interdependent net-
works that leverages the indirect damage inherent in multiplex networks to achieve a damage set
smaller than that found by any existing non-computationally intensive algorithm. We show that
the intuition from single layer networks that decycling (damage of the 2-core) is the most effective
way to destroy the giant component, does not carry over to interdependent networks, and in fact
such approaches are worse than simply removing the highest degree nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Interdependent networked systems are particularly
vulnerable to damage, as damaged sites in one sub-
system cause failures in another, which may in turn prop-
agate damage back to the first [1]. Under sufficient dam-
age, avalanches of propagating failures may eventually
lead to the discontinuous collapse of the whole system
[2]. Many essential natural, technological and social sys-
tems [3–5] consist of fully or partially interdependent
subsystems, allowing them to be represented by such in-
terdependent or multiplex networks. Understanding the
vulnerability of such systems to damage and cascading
collapse is therefore of paramount importance.
If the nodes damaged are selected non-randomly, that
is, the damage is targeted, the amount of damage re-
quired for collapse may be dramatically reduced. In this
paper, we consider the problem of finding the best ap-
proximation to the minimal damage set: a set of nodes
whose removal leads to the collapse of the largest mu-
tually connected component (LMCC). We show that the
characteristics of highly effective strategies on interde-
pendent networks are different from those on single layer
networks. We introduce a new heuristic targeted attack
strategy which exploits the properties of interdependent
or multiplex percolation to effectively destroy the LMCC
more quickly than any previous non-computationally in-
tensive method, with an efficacy approaching that of sim-
ulated annealing, yet with a computation time for node
ranking that is linear in system size.
The quest to identify the minimal set of removals
required to destroy the giant connected component in
a single network has recently received renewed atten-
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tion. The MinSum algorithm [6] combines a message-
passing approach with a statistical mechanics formula-
tion, achieving results which outperform even stochastic
search methods such as simulated annealing. The ap-
proach is essentially similar to the MaxSum [7] method
proposed for threshold problems. While much more com-
putationally efficient than simulated annealing, MinSum
is nevertheless rather complex and opaque. Several more
simple heuristic methods have also been proposed, such
as collective influence (CI) [8, 9], and CoreHD, a direct at-
tack on the 2-core of the largest component [10]. Despite
its simplicity, the CoreHD algorithm performs essentially
as well as MinSum. These methods exploit the observation
that the destruction of the largest connected component
is in grand part a matter of decycling the network, i.e.
removing all loops [6]. Once this is done, the remaining
tree can be broken down in very few steps. All loops in a
network are contained within its 2-core, the subnetwork
in which each member has at least 2 neighbours which are
also members. Hence attacking the 2-core of a network
is an effective strategy for dismantling a network.
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FIG. 1. (Color online.) (a) An example of a (fully) inter-
dependent two-layer network. (b) The mutually connected
components present in this network. (c) The multiplex rep-
resentation of the same network, with (d) the mutually con-
nected components.
2Here we consider the equivalent problem for multiplex
and interdependent networks, where similar progress has
not yet been achieved. An interdependent network con-
sists of two or more network layers, with nodes in differ-
ent layers connected by interdependency links, as shown
in Fig. 1 (a). If a node fails in (is removed from) one
layer, its interdependent partner in another layer also
fails. In the multiplex network representation, interde-
pendent nodes are merged into a single node, and con-
nections in different layers are considered different types
of edge (represented by different colors) [11], Fig. 1 (c).
Mathematically the two representations are equivalent.
The generalization of a connected cluster to multiplex
or interdependent networks is the mutually connected
component (MCC). A node belongs to a MCC if at least
one of its neighbors in the same layer belongs to the same
MCC, and each of its interdependent partners in other
layers also belong to the same MCC [1], as shown in Fig.
1 (b). In the multiplex representation (for fully interde-
pendent networks) this corresponds to the rule that all
pairs of nodes within an MCC must be connected by at
least one path of each edge type (color) [2, 11, 12], Fig. 1
(d). In the thermodynamic limit, the collapse of a giant
mutually connected component (GMCC) under random
damage occurs with a discontinuous hybrid phase transi-
tion [1, 2]. The fraction of vertices that must be randomly
removed to provoke the collapse of the system depends
on the structure of the two layers.
Huang et al. examined the effect of removing nodes
preferentially according to their degree [13], and the re-
sults were extended to partially interdependent networks
in [14]. In [15] the authors consider various existing
strategies, finding the best of them is the limiting case
of that in [13]: remove the nodes with the highest de-
gree sum or product. Similar cascade phenomena occur
in single-layer networks under threshold criteria, such as
the k-core or bootstrap percolation [16–19]. The MaxSum
algorithm [7] provides a message-passing based method
to find good solutions to the minimal seeding set prob-
lem in such threshold models. Such methods could in
principal be applied to the k-core process, but cannot
be directly applied to the multiplex percolation problem,
because a node’s membership of the LMCC cannot be
computed directly from the state of its neighbors, but
instead requires an exploration of the entire cluster [12].
In other words there is no local pruning rule that allows
one to identify the LMCC.
II. TARGETTED DAMAGE STRATEGIES
We consider a configuration model multi-layer network
with M layers. Each node i, i ∈ {1, 2, ...N} in layer
l is interdependent with a single node (for convenience
also labeled i) in each of the other layers, such that re-
moval of i from layer l implies the failure (removal) of all
counterpart nodes i in the other layers [1]. Alternatively,
by considering all the interdependent nodes i as a single
node spanning all layers, the system can be viewed as a
multiplex network, defined by the joint degree distribu-
tion P (q(1), q(2), ..., q(M)) ≡ P (q), such that node i has
degree q
(l)
i in layer l. These two formulations, multiplex
and interdependent networks, are mathematically equiv-
alent [11]. In Sect. V, below, we extend our analysis to
partially interdependent networks, in which some nodes
do not have interdependent partners.
In the limit N → ∞, the GMCC is extensive if it
contains a finite fraction of the nodes in the multiplex.
In large finite networks, we consider the largest mutu-
ally connected component (LMCC) to be extensive if its
size S exceeds
√
N . Starting from a multiplex in which
S >
√
N , our aim, then, is to select the smallest possible
damage set s that destroys the LMCC.
A given attack strategy ranks nodes according to some
metric, and nodes are removed in order starting from
the highest ranked node, until the LMCC collapses. The
fraction pc ≡ |s|/N of removed nodes is the basis of com-
parison between different methods. An adaptive strategy
may be used, with ranks being recalculated after the net-
work reaches equilibrium following each removal. This
also avoids the possibility of redundancies caused by re-
moving nodes that may have been removed anyway by
avalanches. Only nodes belonging to the LMCC at the
current step are considered for removal (including for ran-
dom node removal). Note that the final result depends
only on the set of nodes removed, not on the order of
removal.
FIG. 2. (Color online.) A small grouping of nodes within the
GMCC (LMCC) of a two layer multiplex. Infinity symbols
indicate a connection leading to an infinite GMCC subtree
(or the LMCC 2-core in a finite system) in a given layer. Two
or more such connections correspond to membership of the
GMCC 2-core of that layer. Nodes 1, 2, 5, and 6 belong to
the 2-core within the GMCC in the layer with dashed (blue)
edges. Nodes 1, 2, and 4 belong to the 2-core of the solid
(red) edged layer. Since nodes 1 and 2 belong to the 2-core
of the GMCC in both layers they cannot be removed in an
avalanche. Nodes 3-6 are outside one or both 2-cores and
are therefore in a critical state, potentially being removed in
an avalanche of propagating damage. For example, removal of
node 2 will lead to the removal of all four of these nodes. Dam-
age propagates along critical edges in the direction marked by
arrows.
In interdependent networks, critical nodes are nodes
that depend on a single connection in one (or more) layers
in order to remain within the LMCC. Damage propagates
through clusters of such critical nodes, as the removal of
3one node removes the support from neighboring critical
nodes, and so on, as illustrated in Fig. 2. The avalanches
of damage diverge in size approaching the critical point,
leading to the discontinuous collapse of the GMCC. The
2-cores in each layer within the LMCC play an important
role. Nodes within the LMCC 2-core in a given layer are
not critical with respect to that layer, so that nodes be-
longing to the 2-core in all layers are non-critical, while
nodes failing to belong to one or more of these 2-cores are
in a critical state and may be removed by avalanches,
see Fig. 2. One might therefore imagine that, as in
single-layer networks, destruction of 2-cores might be an
effective strategy in interdependent networks. We there-
fore generalized the leading single-layer strategies which
target 2-cores, to see if they would be effective also in
multiplex networks. Typical results are shown in Fig. 3.
We found that the intuitions gained from studying single
layer networks do not carry over to multiplex networks.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
p
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
S
random
CIpS
CoreHDs
CoreHD1
DegSum
DegProd
EMD
EMD 1 step
EMD 2 steps
0.2 0.25 0.3
p
0
0.4
0.8
S
FIG. 3. (Color online.) Progression of the relative size, S,
of the LMCC with a fraction p of nodes removed, under
different targeted attack strategies for a duplex network of
two uncorrelated Erdo˝s-Re´nyi layers with mean degree µ = 5
and N = 105. From right to left: random damage (dashed,
black), collective influence CIpS(green), CoreHDs (solid blue),
CoreHD1 (dashed blue),highest degree sum DegSum (purple)
and product DegProd (dashed purple), Effective Multiplex
Degree EMD (red). Also shown are the approximate effective
multiplex degree results obtained using only one and two it-
erations of Eq. (2). Inset: Results for N = 104, allowing
comparison with simulated annealing, marked by the arrow.
The collective influence (CI) strategy may be adapted
to multiplex networks by selecting nodes according to
the sum or the product of their scores in each layer. We
use the collective influence propagation CIp algorithm
[9], and results shown are for the sum CIpS. Similarly,
the CoreHD method may be generalized by removing the
nodes with the highest sum of degrees within the union of
the 2-cores of all layers (CoreHDs) or by removing node
with the highest degree within the 2-core of the layer
with the (currently) lowest mean degree (CoreHD1). See
Appendix B for more details. We found, however, that
simply removing the node with the highest degree sum
(DegSum) or product (DegProd) is more effective than any
of these strategies, meaning that focusing on the 2-cores
actually diminishes attack effectiveness. This further un-
derlines the fundamentally different nature of the multi-
plex percolation transition.
III. EFFECTIVE MULTIPLEX DEGREE
Here we introduce a new strategy, Effective Multi-
plex Degree (EMD) which gives a damage set significantly
smaller than that found by any of the methods described
above. The EMD algorithm leverages inhomogeneities be-
tween layer degrees and in the neighborhood of a node
to maximize the effect of node removal.
We seek to ascribe weights wi which represent the im-
pact on the LMCC of removing node i. Consider a con-
nection between nodes i and j in layer l. If i is removed,
j loses an edge in layer l. If node j loses all of its q
(l)
j con-
nections within layer l, it is removed from the LMCC. A
node is most vulnerable in the layer in which it has least
connections. The smaller is q
(l)
j , the bigger is the impact
of losing one of those connections. Suppose that node
j has weight wj , then we ascribe a value wj/q
(l)
j to the
impact of removing the edge from i to j in layer l. The
weight of a node i is then the sum of all the weights as-
cribed to the edges emanating from it, a measure of the
impact of removing i:
wi =
M∑
l=1
∑
j∈N
(l)
i
1
Mj
wj
q
(l)
j
, (1)
where N (l)i is the set of neighbors of node i in layer l, and
Mj is the number of layers in which node j participates.
This naturally accounts for the case of partial interde-
pendence, see Sect. V below. The EMD weights are the
self-consistent solutions of this set of equation. Larger
weights are found in nodes with more connections, and
with connections to other highly weighted nodes in the
layer in which they are weakest.
Eq. (1) may be written more compactly as the matrix
equation
w = Rw (2)
with
Rij =
M∑
l=1
a
(l)
ij
Mjq
(l)
j
(3)
where a
(l)
ij are the elements of the adjacency matrix in
layer l. The matrix R is a left stochastic matrix. Since
the weights wi are all positive, by the Perron-Frobenius
theorem, the vector w is the leading right eigenvector of
R, corresponding to the largest eigenvalue 1.
The weight wi is equal to the equilibrium probability
to find a random walker at node i, when the random
walker at each step chooses uniformly between layers,
4and selects an edge uniformly within that layer to follow.
In [20] a type of random walk is introduced which is a
classical random walk within the layers and at each node
the walker is allowed to randomly switch to the multi-
plex counterpart node in a negligible time. This process
is equivalent to the one described by our matrix R in
a fully interdependent network of an arbitrary number
of layers. Note, however, that the random walk corre-
sponding to matrix R is defined for an arbitrary network
of networks, in which any node can have an arbitrary
number of interdependency neighbours in other layers.
In [21] a node centrality index, called Functional Multi-
plex PageRank, is introduced. This corresponds to a ran-
dom walker on a general directed multiplex network with
an arbitrary combination of overlapping links. Although
the random walk transition probability, from a node to its
neighbour, may depend on the type of link overlap, it is
essentially determined by an “aggregated degree” of each
node. The major advantage of EMD over this centrality
definition is that it incorporates the degree-heterogeneity
of nodes over different layers. This degree-heterogeneity
is essentially important for the robustness of multiplex
networks or the dynamical processes running on top of
them. A number of other variations of random walks
have been defined for interdependent networks [22, 23]
which treat interdependency links as qualitatively the
same - from the point of view of the random walker -
as intralayer connectivity links.
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FIG. 4. Absolute difference between damaging fraction pc(t)
obtained by limiting to k iterations of Eq. (2) and final value
pc, for two fully interdependent Erdo˝s-Re´nyi layers with mean
degree µ = 5 and N = 105 nodes, averaged over 10 realiza-
tions (circles, red). Initial value t = 0 corresponds to highest
degree sum strategy. Also shown are progressions for partially
interdependent networks, f = 0.6 (squares) and f = 0.3 (tri-
angles).
A simplified, non self-referential weight may be ob-
tained by using the degree sum Qj =
∑M
l=1 q
(l)
j in place
of wj in Eq. (1):
w˜i =
M∑
l=1
∑
j∈N
(l)
i
1
Mj
Qj
q
(l)
j
. (4)
This already gives significant improvement over DegSum
and DegProd, see results EMD1 in Fig. 3. The con-
vergence to w can be examined by considering the se-
quence of weights obtained by iterating Eq. (2). We
use as initial values the degree sum, w
(0)
i = Qi, and
define wi
(t+1) =
∑
j Rijw
(t)
j , so that w
(1)
i = w˜i, and
wi = w
(t→∞)
i . In Fig. 4 we plot the collapse thresh-
old pc obtained by restricting the number of iterations of
Eq. (2). We see that the result converges rapidly after
only a very few iterations. For a fixed number t of itera-
tions, the calculation of w(t) is linear in system size. See
Appendix A for a more detailed discussion.
IV. RESULTS
To illustrate the results obtained by our method, in
Fig. 3 we consider a multiplex consisting of two Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi layers with equal mean degree, and plot the rela-
tive size S of the largest mutually connected component
as a function of the fraction p of nodes removed, start-
ing with the largest weight max{wi}, and recalculating
the weights after each removal. The LMCC collapses
at a fraction pc that is significantly lower than for any of
the other methods described. The result approaches that
found by simulated annealing on a relatively small net-
work (N = 104). The computational budget required to
perform simulated annealing grows rapidly with N , and
already for N = 105, our method outperforms the sim-
ulated annealing results achievable in a reasonable com-
puting time (see Appendix C). Furthermore, the surviv-
ing LMCC size S falls more rapidly than in other meth-
ods, being smaller at every value of p.
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FIG. 5. (Color online.) Results for the relative number of
nodes removed in destruction of the LMCC for two Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi layers, both with varying mean degree µ. (a) Values
of µ from 3 to 8 (b) µ from 9 to 25. All networks consist of
N = 10000 nodes. The networks are fully interdependent and
the two layers are uncorrelated. All results were averaged over
10 realizations, except for Simulated Annealing (SA), which
was a single realization.
To understand the range of effectiveness of the method,
we investigated several combinations of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and
uncorrelated scale-free layers to compare the performance
of our EMD algorithm with other attack strategies, in dif-
ferent scenarios. In Fig. 5 we illustrate the dependence
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FIG. 6. Collapse threshold pc for different attack strategies
for (a) two uncorrelated Erdo˝s-Re´nyi layers, with different
mean degrees. One layer has fixed mean degree µ1 = 5 while
the other has mean degree µ2. and (b) two power-law degree
distributed layers, P (q) ∝ q−γ as a function of powerlaw ex-
ponent γ. Each layer has N = 10, 000, 10 realizations, except
simulated annealing, 1 realization.
2 3 4
γ
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.20
0.22
p
c
a
2 3 4
γ
0.18
0.22
0.26
0.30
p
c
b
FIG. 7. (Color online.) Results for the relative number of
nodes removed in destruction of the LMCC for (a) two scale-
free layers, both with mean degree 10, one with exponent γ1 =
2.5, the other with varying exponent γ2 and (b) An Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi layer and a scale-free layer both with mean degree 10,
and varying degree distribution exponent γ. In this case the
CoreHD1 algorithm was modified to always attack the scale-
free layer.
on network density. We plot the results for two Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi layers with equal mean degree µ. As µ increases
the performance ranking of the different attack methods
remains the same, with the exception of CoreHD1, which
begins to become relatively more effective. With very few
vulnerable nodes in dense networks, reducing the density
of one of the layers starts to become a more effective
strategy. Our EMD algorithm remains the most effective
across all the values of µ tested.
If one layer (of a two layer network) is much more dense
than the other, the membership in the LMCC of a pair of
interdependent nodes is effectively decided by the node in
the less dense layer, and the network behaves as a single
layer network. In this case, single layer strategies may be
more effective than multiplex ones. To explore this pos-
sibility, we considered a duplex network with the mean
degree of one layer, µ1, fixed, and varied the mean degree
µ2 of the second layer, Fig. 6 (a). For large µ2, the best
single layer strategy, CoreHD1 becomes the leading strat-
egy, confirming the fact that beyond a certain density in
layer 2, the destruction of the LMCC is equivalent to the
destruction of the largest connected component in layer
1.
To examine the effect of heterogeneity in network de-
gree, we considered two scale-free layers. When the two
layers have the same powerlaw distribution, with expo-
nent γ, varying γ has no effect on the ranking of the algo-
rithms, with EMD always outperforming the other meth-
ods, Fig. 6 (b). Similarly, if we fix the exponent for one
layer, and vary it for the other layer, again the relative
effectiveness of the different methods is unchanged, Fig.
7(a).
Finally we considered what happens when one layer is
of a significantly different character than the other, by
pairing an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi layer with a scale-free layer, each
with the samemean degree, Fig. 7(b). DegProd improved
relative to the other methods. We modified the CoreHD1
method to attack only the scale-free layer, as highly het-
erogeneous networks are more fragile under targetted at-
tack, and found that this algorithm outperformed even
EMD, reinforcing our results for layers of different densi-
ties, that when one layer is significantly more fragile than
the other, single layer strategies are more effective.
V. PARTIAL INTERDEPENDENCE
a
b
FIG. 8. (Color online.) (a) The multiplex representation of
a partially interdependent two-layer network. Interdependent
nodes are shown as open circles, non interdependent nodes as
closed circles. In (b) we show the mutually connected compo-
nents present in this network. Note that non interdependent
nodes may belong to more than one MCC.
The condition that every node is interdependent with
nodes in other layers is a strong one. This may be relaxed
to give a more realistic model by considering partially in-
terdependent two-layer networks [24], parameterized by
the fraction of nodes f within a given layer which are in-
terdependent. When f = 1, the network is fully interde-
pendent. When f = 0 the layers are not interdependent
at all, and the system behaves as a pair of single-layer net-
works. In the multiplex representation, the fraction of in-
terdependent nodes in the entire system is f˜ = f/(2−f).
A simple example of such a network is illustrated in Fig.
8 (a). Under random damage, the collapse of the GMCC
transitions from a hybrid discontinuous transition to a
6second order percolation transition for sufficiently small
f [24].
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FIG. 9. Comparison of collapse threshold pc as a function of
interdependent node fraction f for different targeted attack
strategies for a duplex network of two uncorrelated Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi layers with mean degree µ = 5 and N = 10, 000, av-
eraged over 50 realizations. Simulated annealing results were
averaged over five realization.
The definition of mutually connected components in
this case is not as obvious as for fully interdependent
networks. Usually a recursive definition of the giant mu-
tually connected component (GMCC) is used, whereby
a node belongs to the GMCC if it has at least one link
to the GMCC in its own layer, and all of the nodes with
which it is interdependent also belong to the GMCC. In
terms of multiplex networks, this corresponds to the con-
dition that a node has at least one link to the GMCC in
each of the layers in which it participates. This defini-
tion applies both to fully and partially interdependent
networks. However, we are not aware of a strict defini-
tion of finite mutually connected components in partially
interdependent networks.
In this work we define a mutually connected compo-
nent (MCC), in a multiplex, to be a maximal set of
nodes that are connected on all the layers they partic-
ipate on. In other words, for interdependent networks:
for any layer, all the nodes of the MCC that are present
on the given layer must form a connected cluster on this
layer. This definition is a straightforward interpretation
of the widely accepted recursive definition. Note that ac-
cording to this definition it is possible for MCCs to over-
lap: nodes that only participate on one layer may belong
to more than one MCC (see the example in Fig. 8 (b).
However, interdependent nodes (nodes that are present
on all layers) can only be members of one MCC. There-
fore interdependent nodes form the disjunct “cores” of
MCCs in partially interdependent networks. In actual
simulations one needs to identify all MCCs and choose
the largest of them, to identify the LMCC.
We compared the results of our Effective Multiplex De-
gree method against other methods as a function of f ,
Fig. 9. Note that the EMD algorithm naturally generalizes
to partially interdependent networks. When f = 0, in
the absence of any interdependence, naturally the single
layer methods CoreHDs and CIpS perform best. In this
case EMD simply returns the node degree. As f increases,
the performance of EMD steadily improves relative to the
single layer methods. Beyond approximately f = 1/2
it outperforms all other methods except CoreHD1. The
relatively strong performance of CoreHD1 for moderately
large values of f is intriguing, but we do not know of
a simple explanation. Our EMD method outperforms all
other studied methods beyond the point where approx-
imately one third of the nodes are non-interdependent
(f˜ = 2/3, f = 0.8). In this case this point coincides with
the value of f below which the non-interpendent nodes
form a giant cluster by themselves.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The problem of finding the minimal damaging set of
even a single layer network is already a difficult problem,
though recent effort has produced simple algorithms that
produce highly effective approximations of the minimal
set. Here our aim is to extend this effort to interde-
pendent and multiplex networks. Due to the non-local
definition of mutually connected clusters (the commonly
used generalization of connected cluster to multi-layer
systems) – there is no local pruning algorithm that can
give the LMCC – this task is even more difficult. We show
that reasonable generalizations of single network meth-
ods, while more effective than random attacks, are far
from optimal. Rather surprisingly, direct attacks based
solely on node degrees are more effective.
We have developed a simple heuristic algorithm that
exploits the heterogeneity between nodes’ degrees in dif-
ferent layers, and the vulnerability of nodes in the neigh-
borhood to give a damaging set significantly smaller than
that found by any other computationally non-intensive
methods, and approaching the damaging set size found
by computationally costly simulated annealing. The ad-
vantage of our method is that, due to its low compu-
tational overhead, it may be applied to very large sys-
tems, where Monte-Carlo methods like simulated anneal-
ing would be prohibitively expensive (in time and com-
putational power) to carry out.
Our method naturally generalizes to partially interde-
pendent networks, and remains more effective than other
methods so long as interdependent nodes remain in a sig-
nificant majority. When there is a significant difference
in density between two layers, the connectivity of the
system is controlled by the less dense layer, and single
layer methods again become the most effective. Our algo-
rithm also naturally extends to more general formulations
of dependency within networks, for example the case of
networks of “connectivity” links and “dependency” links
[25]. A study of the effectiveness of Effective Multiplex
Degree in such networks is left for future work.
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Appendix A: Computation of Effective Multiplex
Degree algorithm
In this appendix we discuss the computation of the Ef-
fective Multiplex Degrees (EMDs) on an arbitrary multi-
plex network. We show that this algorithm is computa-
tionally efficient, essentially preserving the complexity of
existing popular strategies, while providing considerably
better results.
The EMD values are computed iteratively according
to
w
(t+1)
i =
M∑
l=1
∑
j∈N
(l)
i
1
Mj
w
(t)
j
q
(l)
j
, (A1)
where N (l)i is the set of neighbours of node i on layer l
and q
(l)
j is the degree of node j on layer l. Note that
Eq. (A1) can also be used for partially interdependent
networks. In this case some of the N (l)i will be empty sets
and some of the q
(l)
i will be 0. We set the initial values
w
(t=0)
i to the sum of the degrees of nodes i over all the
layers (see Eq. (4)). In most cases this is a good initial
guess, especially in partially interdependent networks for
small values of f (fraction of interdependent nodes). For
f = 0 this initial guess coincides with the actual solution.
In Eq. (A1) we only consider nodes and links inside the
LMCC. In this case the matrix involved in Eq. (A1) -
Eq. (3) in the main text - is a left stochastic matrix (i.e.,
has a largest eigenvalue 1), the weights wi converge to
the components of the principal right eigenvector.
The number of operations required in computing one
iteration of Eq. (A1) is ∼ L, the number of links in the
network, as we have to sum over all the neighbours on all
the layers for every node. The overall time complexity of
our algorithm is therefore
T ∼ niterL, (A2)
where niter is the number of iterations to convergence.
Assuming niter to be a constant number, the EMD algo-
rithm runs in time linear in system size, achieving essen-
tially the same efficiency as that of DegSum and CoreHD.
(Of course, considering the complete problem of destroy-
ing the largest mutually connected component, we must
repeat the identification of the LMCC and the node se-
lection step for every node in the damaging set. This
applies to all of the adaptive strategies considered.)
As shown in Fig. 4 (b), typically only a few (3-5)
iterations of Eq. (A1) are needed to achieve practically
the same result as for the fully converged solutions. (Our
criterion for the solutions to have “fully converged” is
that the largest relative difference of all the wi values in
an iteration be less than 10−7.) This proved to be the
case for a range of f values and different types of network
architectures, so indeed it seems reasonable to consider
niter to be a small constant.
Method to identify the components
To identify MCCs in a partially interdependent net-
work, one can do the following. First identify all the
connected components on layer 1, and call these “can-
didate components”. (These candidate components may
contain interdependent nodes and free nodes on layer 1.)
Then consider the next layer, check if the interdepen-
dent nodes of the existing candidate components form
connected components on layer 2 (also considering free
nodes on layer 2). If any of the interdependent nodes of
existing candidate components are disconnected on layer
2, then subdivide them into connected components (con-
nected on layer 2, considering also free nodes on layer 2)
and mark them as new candidate components. Repeating
this procedure on every layer, make as many subdivisions
as necessary until the point when a full iteration (check-
ing all the layers sequentially) can be done without fur-
ther subdivisions. At this point the interdependent nodes
in the existing candidate components are the ”cores” of
MCCs in the network. As mentioned earlier, MCCs in
partially interdependent networks may overlap, but the
interdependent cores of MCCs are disjunct.
To find all the members of an MCC that a given core
belongs to, simply search for all the nodes reachable from
the interdependent members of each core, on each layer.
This step may involve the addition of a large number of
free nodes to the MCC. Because MCCs can overlap - and
the overlap may be large - it is generally not efficient to
store all the members of all MCCs. A good strategy is
to just store the interdependent cores of MCCs (these
cannot overlap), then the actual MCC that a given core
belongs to can be quickly reproduced in a simple search
on all the layers.
Because MCCs can overlap in partially interdependent
networks, their sizes do not obey any obvious normaliza-
tion condition, and their size distribution, to our knowl-
edge, has not yet been investigated. Such studies are
outside the scope of this paper, where we only concen-
trated on identifying the largest of the MCCs, i.e., the
one that has the most members (free or interdependent).
Appendix B: Generalisation of existing strategies to
multiplex networks
In this appendix we discuss the multiplex generaliza-
tions of some of the most efficient single-layer damage
schemes. Of the great number of possibilities we con-
8centrate on some simple and meaningful generalizations
that formed the basis for our comparison of the EMD strat-
egy with other efficient algorithms. All of the algorithms
considered in this work - including EMD - are “adaptive”,
meaning that after removing a node, all of the weights of
the remaining nodes are recalculated.
Highest Degree
The multiplex generalization of the Highest Degree
strategy is simple and straightforward. Each node has
a well-defined degree on each of the layers in which it
participates. We considered two ways of combining these
degrees. We define the DegSum score of node i as the
sum of the degrees of node i over all the layers in which
it participates. Similarly, let the DegProd score be the
product of the degrees of node i over all the layers in
which it participates. These two strategies provide sim-
ilar results, which are - somewhat surprisingly - signifi-
cantly better than results from the multiplex versions of
the more sophisticated CoreHD and CIp algorithms.
CoreHD
Many possibilities arise when aiming to generalize the
CoreHD algorithm to multiplex networks. Firstly, one
may consider the intersection of the 2-cores of the sepa-
rate layers, or the union of them. We have tried varia-
tions of both and found that strategies where only the in-
tersection of the 2-cores was considered always performed
noticably worse than methods dealing with the union of
the 2-cores. It appears that considering only the inter-
section is not a good strategy, because a node that is the
member of a 2-core only on one layer may still play a
more important role - by virtue of this one layer - than
some other less connected nodes that happen to be in
the intersection of the 2-cores. Due to these considera-
tions we focus on generalizations of CoreHD that attack
the union of the 2-cores of the separate layers.
A second question that arises is how to combine the
CoreHD scores of different layers. We considered both a
“sum” and a “product” version, CoreHDS and CoreHDP
respectively. For a given node i these methods simply
compute the sum or the product of the CoreHD scores for
each layer of node i. If node i is in the intersection of the
2-cores, then it has a well-defined CoreHD score (≥ 2) on
each layer. If on any of the layers node i does not belong
to the 2-core, we assign it a score 0 for the given layer in
the case of CoreHDS and 1 in the case of CoreHDP. This
scheme applies also to partially interdependent networks:
a node certainly does not belong to the 2-core of a layer in
which it does not participate, and so it is assigned a score
as explained above. When none of the layers contain a 2-
core, i.e., all layers are trees, we proceed with the DegSum
algorithm to break the MCCs up into sub-extensive sizes.
This generally only takes a small number of steps and the
actual method of tree-breaking does not play a relevant
role. For the majority of networks considered CoreHDS
proved to be the better strategy, therefore this was chosen
in the main text for comparison with other methods. (In
most cases CoreHDP produced very similar, slightly worse
results.)
As pointed out in the main text, when one of the lay-
ers in the multiplex network is much sparser than the
others, then this layer may essentially determine connec-
tivity in the network. Destroying the LMCC in this case
corresponds closely to destroying the largest component
in the weakest (most sparse) layer, therefore single layer
attack strategies can be expected to work very well. We
considered an algorithm - CoreHD1 - where, in every step,
we find the layer on which the LMCC has the smallest
mean degree. Then we assign weights to nodes using the
original CoreHD method on this layer. As can be seen
in Fig. 4 of the main text, CoreHD1 is a very good can-
didate for multiplex networks with highly different layer
densities, but also performs well in symmetric networks
with a moderate fraction of interdependent nodes.
Collective Influence Propagation
We considered a multiplex generalization of the Col-
lective Influence Propagation (CIp) algorithm [9]. For
simplex networks this algorithm was shown to work bet-
ter than the previous Collective Influence algorithm, so
we chose only to focus on a generalization of CIp. This
algorithm assigns a number to all nodes in a single layer:
for nodes in the 2-core the score is positive, and for nodes
outside the 2-core the score is 0. Again we have a choice
of how to combine the scores of nodes on different layers.
Unlike in the case of simplex networks, where only the
relative value of scores matters, here the normalization
of the CIp scores becomes relevant, because the scores of
nodes on different layers must be comparable in a mean-
ingful way. (Note that this issue does not arise in the
case of CoreHD, where the scores are simply the degrees
- inside the 2-core - of nodes in the 2-core.) An intu-
itively appropriate normalization scheme is to have the
CIp scores on each layer sum to Nm, the number of nodes
on layer m. Then, we define the values CIpS(i) for each
node i as the sum of the (correctly normalized) CIp(i)
values over all the layers in which node i participates.
We did not consider the “product” version of the CIp
algorithm, because in this case the following problem
arises. Consider two nodes on a given layer that have
the same CIp values (on this layer). Assume that one
of the nodes is present only on this layer, but the other
one participates on all other layers. If the latter (inter-
dependent) node has CIp values less than 1 on the other
layers, it will receive a score that is less than the score of
the first (free) node, if the scores of different layers are
combined as a product. This is rather counterintuitive.
There are certainly ways of circumventing this problem,
but such methods would look rather contrived and ar-
9bitrary, therefore we chose to consider only the “sum”
version, CIpS.
Appendix C: Simulated Annealing
As a benchmark, against which all other strategies can
be compared, we used a Simulated Annealing (SA) al-
gorithm to identify a close upper bound on the size of
the minimal damaging set that makes the LMCC sub-
extensive. Our SA method employs a standard Metropo-
lis Monte Carlo algorithm as follows. We consider the
configuration space where all nodes in the network (free
or interdependent) can be in one of two states: present
or removed. We exclude all configurations where there
is an extensive LMCC in the network, when only nodes
present are considered. (Our criterion for “extensive” is
to have a size larger than
√
N , the square root of the
network size.) We define the energy of a configuration
simply as the number R of nodes removed. We simulate
this system in thermal equilibrium at temperature T by
applying the following steps repeatedly:
1. We choose a node in the network uniformly at ran-
dom and make the trial change of switching its
state to the opposite. (If it was removed, switch to
present and if it was present, switch to removed.)
2. Find the size of the LMCC in the network and if it
is extensive (>
√
N), reverse the trial change and
go to Step 1.
3. If the LMCC after the trial change is still sub-
extensive, accept the trial change with probability
p = min(1, e−∆R/T ) and go to Step 1.
As initial condition, we set all nodes to removed, i.e.,
R = N . The initial temperature for the simulations was
Tmax = 1 and in every step it was reduced by δT until
Tmin = 0.01 was reached. δT = 10
−7 was used for net-
works of size N = 104, and in a reasonable running time
results were all considerably better than those provided
by faster attack strategies. For network size N = 105, it
was necessary to increase δT to 10−6 in order to maintain
a feasible running time. As a result, SA already performed
much worse than some of the best heuristic strategies.
Simulated annealing is a widely used technique that is
assumed to approach the optimal solution when given
sufficient time to thoroughly probe the configuration
space. It is therefore a good choice as a benchmark for
comparisons, but it is prohibitively slow for large system
sizes, so can’t be considered a viable candidate for prac-
tical purposes. Also, being a purely stochastic method,
it does not give us any insight as to the structure of a
good damage set.
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